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CHAPTER 2 
Welfare Law 
DIANE LUND and TOBY SHERWOOD 
§2.1. Introduction. During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the recipients 
of public assistance saw some of the ground previously gained by wel-
fare rights activity apparently lost as the initiative for welfare reform 
shifted from state and local governments to the relatively remote arena 
of Washington and as political attitudes began to reflect the country's 
economic problems. The presidential proposal for a federal take-over 
of welfare1 and the ensuing round of discussions, hearings, critiques, 
and counterproposals encouraged a wait-and-see attitude on the part 
of local governments and apparently preempted attempts to achieve 
immediate welfare reforms of a less comprehensive nature. State legis-
latures did not hesitate, however, to attempt to reduce the burden of 
welfare on state finances. Proposals to reduce benefits were introduced 
in 26 states during the 1970-1971 legislative sessions.2 Many states 
that refrained from action with respect to assistance levels neverthe-
less legislated to change or eliminate administrative practices which 
were thought to contribute to rising welfare expenses.3 Some states, 
such as New York, did both.4 
Given the present state of national affairs it is difficult to predict 
the future direction of the welfare rights movement or the progress 
it will be able to make. The movement has successfully pursued in the 
courts its objective of obtaining for recipients of public assistance the 
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§2.1. 1 H.R. I, 92d Cong., lst Sess. (1971) (a bill to amend the Social Security Act 
to make improvements in the maternal and child health programs with emphasis on im-
provements in their operating effectiveness, to authorize a family assistance plan pro-
viding basic benefits to low-income families with children, with incentives for employ-
ment and training, to improve the capacity for employment of members of such families, 
to achieve more uniform treatment of recipients under the federal-state public assistance 
programs and otherwise improve such programs, and for other purposes). 
2 N.Y. Times, July 9, 1971, at I, col. 5, reporting U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and 
Welfare, Trends in AFDC Benefit Levels-Summer Memorandum (July 1971). 
3 E.g., Mass. Acts of 1971, c. 719, Item 1906-2000 (requirement that employable per-
sons receive assistance checks from the nearest office of the Division of Employment 
Security); see §2.8 infra. 
4 New York has reduced its standard-of-living rates (N.Y. Laws 1971, c. 133), attempted 
to impose a residency requirement (N.Y. Laws 1971, c. 606, enjoined in Lopez v. Wyman, 
329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) ), and instituted new procedures intended to put em-
ployable persons to work when jobs can be found (N.Y. Laws 1971, c. 102). 
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benefits to which they are entitled by law and the protections guaran-
teed to all Americans.5 The limits of judicial willingness to stand be-
hind those benefits and protections, however, now may well have been 
reached;6 it appears unlikely that the United States Supreme Court 
will embrace an absolute "right to welfare" in the near future. 7 With-
out such an outright endorsement by the high court, it is doubtful that 
direct improvement of benefit levels can be obtained through litiga-
tion. The improvement of the status of welfare recipients remains a 
subject to be dealt with through the political process. 
§2.2. Assistance payments and related benefits: Right of striking 
workers to public assistance. During the 1971 SuRVEY year the only 
decision upholding the right of persons to receive public assistance 
was ITT Lamp Division of International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corp. v. Minter. 1 The plaintiff in that action challenged the power 
of the Commonwealth to grant welfare benefits to indigent strikers. 
ITT, seeking emergency injunctive relief, claimed that the granting 
of welfare benefits by the Commonwealth was state action which al-
tered the relative economic strength of the parties to the strike and 
thus conflicted with the national policy of free collective bargaining. 
It further argued that granting benefits to strikers violated the Massa-
chusetts welfare statutes and the Social Security Act by making pay-
ments to persons who had refused a bona fide offer of employment 
without good cause.2 The federal district court refused to grant a 
preliminary injunction on the basis of either the state or the federal 
statute, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. In 
considering the question of whether or not the state or federal welfare 
laws had been transgressed, the circuit court relied upon the welfare 
commissioner's administrative determination that the strikers were 
eligible for welfare. The circuit court recognized the difficulties in-
herent in making a factual determination as to whether going out on 
strike was refusing employment with good cause, and noted that the 
federal welfare scheme had envisioned that the state would make that 
determination if necessary. In the case of the ITT strikers the welfare 
5 E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fees to be waived for indi-
gents seeking divorces); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (fair hearing required 
prior to termination of welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 
(invalidating one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits); King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating "substitute father" regulation). 
6 Efforts to expand the concept of entitlement to welfare benefits received a severe 
setback in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland's policy of imposing 
a maximum grant limitation on the amount of monthly welfare payments to a family 
unit was upheld despite the fact that it worked an extreme hardship upon large families 
and the children in those families). 
7 In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), which affirmed the welfare department's 
right to precondition the receipt of welfare payments upon a visit to the recipient's home 
by a welfare worker, the interest of the public in seeing that welfare funds are properly 
expended was analogized to the interest of one who dispenses "purely private charity." 
§2.2. 1 318 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970). 
2 42 U .S.C. §607(b)(l)(B); G.L., c. 117, §lB. 
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department had made such a determination. Because there was no 
evidence that either Congress or the Massachusetts legislature had 
explicitly or implicitly disqualified strikers per se from receiving wel-
fare benefits, the circuit court was unable to conclude that the admin-
istrative determination of striker eligibility for welfare would probably 
be found to be precluded by either state or federal law. 
ITT Lamp, while reaching what appears to be the correct and so-
cially desirable result, nonetheless demonstrates the constrained ap-
proach which the judiciary appears to be taking with respect to the 
right to welfare benefits. In fact, ITT Lamp may be a harbinger of a 
disinclination on the part of courts to recognize even a broad statutory 
right to receive public assistance. It is not encouraging to note the 
circuit court's apparently willing acceptance of a discretionary admin-
istrative determination as to the eligibility of strikers for welfare bene-
fits, especially where there was no statutory basis for resolving the 
case upon such a ground.3 On the other hand, the absence of any dis-
pute as to the propriety of the court's approach may have contributed 
to the result in the instant case, and thus the case may not have any 
broader significance in the future. 
§2.3. Administrative procedures: Right to a full hearing. The 
unresponsiveness of the administrative maze that makes up our present 
welfare system is amply demonstrated in Duato v. Commissioner of 
Public Welfare, 1 a case in which the plaintiff, Ms. Duato, challenged 
the welfare department's regulation limiting the work-related ex-
penses of a working welfare recipient to $11 per month.2 The plain-
tiff alleged actual expenses in excess of $40 per month, and submitted 
proof of them before a welfare department referee. No transcript was 
made of that hearing. The referee found that $11 was the proper 
amount of expenses. Since there was no record of the hearing and the 
3 The statutes establishing the Massachusetts welfare programs, when read literally, 
require the Department of Public Welfare to do much more for the needy than is being 
done now. At the time of the ITT Lamp decision, Chapter 117 of the General Laws, the 
chapter pertaining to the General Relief program, stated in Section 1 that the Common-
wealth "shall relieve and support all poor and indigent persons residing or found there-
in" and provided that the aid furnished "shall be sufficient to enable parents to bring 
up their children properly and to maintain an adequate standard of living for persons or 
families or children." Chapter 118 of the General Laws, which governs the program for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), contains similar language in Section 
2. The statutory language prescribes a criterion for eligibility based upon need, and re-
quires that the assistance given be sufficient in amount. The sufficiency standard is not 
met in practice. Decisions such as ITT Lamp tend to encourage a like disregard of the 
statutory criterion of need. 
§2.3. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 999,270 N.E.2d 782. 
2 Mass. Public Assistance Policy Manual c. IV, at 3, as transmitted by State Letter 264, 
Aug. 5, 1970, provides: "Earnings or wages must be considered in determining income to 
the recipient. In determining the amount which is available as income from employment, 
the following work-related expenses are to be considered. Compulsory deductions for 
Social Security taxes, Federal and State income taxes based on allowable dependents, re-
tirement contributions, health insurance premiums, union dues and $2.50 per week 
($11.00 per month) for other expenses essential to being employed." 
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referee's opinion was brief, it was not clear whether the referee had 
based his decision on the departmental regulation or whether he had 
determined that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the plain-
tiff's work-related expenses in fact exceeded $11 per month. On her 
appeal to the superior court, the plaintiff requested leave to present 
evidence as to her actual expenses. Leave was granted by the court 
without objection by the commissioner. The trial judge found that all 
items other than plaintiff's weekly transportation expense of $2 were 
"questionable as work-related expenses," and he affirmed the refer-
ee's decree. In her bill of review filed in the Supreme Judicial Court, 
Duato attacked the welfare department's regulation on the grounds 
that it had been improperly promulgated and was contrary to federal 
law. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, on consideration of the case, first de-
clared that the superior court judge should not have attempted a de 
novo factual determination as to the expenses submitted by Ms. Duato, 
but rather should have limited his inquiry to the record of the admin-
istrative hearing and to any procedural irregularities that might have 
occurred therein. The Court then explained that even if it were assumed 
that the regulation was invalid and the department's decision therefore 
illegal, the plaintiff would still have to show that her substantial 
rights had been prejudiced by the decision. The Court held that the 
plaintiff had failed to sustain her burden of proof on that point and 
stated that it was within the discretion of the referee to disbelieve the 
evidence presented by the plaintiff. 
Duato was an attempt to force the welfare department to reflect ac-
curately in the employed recipient's assistance grant the cost to the 
recipient of earning his or her wages. The question is of more than 
academic interest to a working welfare recipient and to the taxpayer. 
At issue is the amount of expenses which will be deducted by the wel-
fare department from the welfare recipient's pay in determining the 
amount by which the welfare recipient's assistance grant will be re-
duced to account for wage income. Improper recognition of work-
related expenses will lead to out-of-pocket losses for the welfare recip-
ient and create employment disincentives; the net results will be a 
decreasing number of employed poor and an increasing welfare cost. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court apparently 
assumed that the plaintiff had failed to prove to the referee's satisfac-
tion that her work-related expenses were greater than $11. No con-
sideration appears to have been given by the Court to the possibility 
At the present time, the Massachusetts Public Assistance Policy Manual is updated by 
means of numbered state letters sent by the commissioner to the staff and other persons 
who possess copies of the manual and are on the department's mailing list. The state 
letters sometimes transmit new pages to be inserted in the manual, which is looseleaf. 
Transmittal letters become obsolete upon receipt and usually so state. Often, however, 
the letter itself contains new policy material and thus must be retained as a supplement 
to the manual. 
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that the referee had not evaluated the plaintiff's evidence as to actual 
expenses and thus had not in fact decided the issue on the merits. 
The plaintiff could not directly present the merits of her case to the 
Supreme Judicial Court because the inadequate machinery and im-
proper functioning of the welfare department made it impossible for 
her to obtain a full hearing on the issue in the first instance.3 The 
failure of the initial hearing to fully document the facts and reasoning 
of the referee's decision ultimately proved fatal when the plaintiff 
found herself unable to expose the initial flaws at the appellate level. 
By unquestioningly assuming on the basis of a record devoid of ex-
planation that the referee had considered the merits of the plaintiff's 
case, the Court managed to avoid an examination of the broader ques-
tions which plaintiff was attempting to raise. 
The welfare department has been and continues to be shamefully 
understaffed for fair hearings, with less than ten examiners assigned 
to handle hearings throughout the entire state. At the time of this 
writing only one stenographer is employed by the welfare department 
to cover fair hearings; the alternative is an unreliable and often un-
decipherable recording mechanism. If, in addition to these deficiencies, 
a welfare recipient at the fair hearing encounters an examiner who 
refuses to consider the issues she or he wishes to present, it is obvious 
that whatever faith the recipient might have had as to the efficacy of 
pursuing administrative remedies will be sorely tried, if not destroyed. 
The inability of the welfare department to respond to the legitimate 
needs of the poor, as in Duato, continues to frustrate those who are 
trying to demonstrate that working within the system can succeed. 
Lack of response is commonplace within the welfare department, 
where the problem of keeping costs down is particularly acute and the 
relative political powerlessness of the poor makes responsiveness to 
their legitimate needs on the part of the department a matter of low 
priority. 
§2.4. Reduction of benefit payments: Administrative regulations 
and individual need. As in Duato v. Commissioner of Public Wel-
fare,1 the plaintiff in Dullea v. Ott2 was attempting to compel the 
3 G.L., c. 18, §16 creates a right to a "fair hearing," which may be exercised by any 
person aggrieved by those welfare department actions specified in the statute. (A hear-
ing of this nature is required by federal laws for aggrieved recipients of or applicants 
for assistance under joint federal-state programs such as AFDC.) Under Section 16, the 
hearing is to be conducted as an adjudicatory proceeding under Chapter 30A of the Gen· 
eral Laws, the state's administrative procedure act. Welfare department fair hearings are 
held before referees who are employees of the department. The quality of tht; hearings 
is affected adversely by the totally inadequate appropriations for welfare administration. 
A further difficulty is created by some uncertainty as to the function of the fair hearing 
referees; many of them do not consider it their task to inquire into the legality or pro· 
priety of departmental regulations and instead restrict themselves to applying the per· 
tinent regulation strictly to the given facts. This restrictive approach prevents any dis· 
cussion of the validity of regulations at the administrative level. 
§2.4. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 999,270 N.E.2d 782, discussed in §2.3 supra. 
2316F. Supp.l273(D. Mass.l970). 
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welfare department, in applying its regulations, to take into account 
all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The plaintiff 
had moved from the apartment where she had lived with her children 
to an apartment which she shared with her children, her father, and 
her stepmother. In accordance with the welfare department's regula-
tions, the plaintiff's welfare grant was immediately reduced, without 
resort to the statutory fair hearing procedure. The plaintiff alleged 
that she had been denied due process of law in that her grant had been 
reduced prior to the fair hearing. The federal district court held that 
the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, and that a fair hearing prior to the reduction of plaintiff's 
grant was not required by either the federal Constitution or state law 
since there was no adjudicative fact in issue. The plaintiff concededly 
had changed her living arrangements, and the welfare department's 
regulation provided for a corresponding reduction in the level of 
assistance whenever a change of that particular type was made. The 
court specifically found that .the department's use of living arrange-
ments as a basis upon which to determine the welfare recipient's bene-
fit level was not so arbitrary as to support a claim that plaintiff had 
been deprived of substantive due process. In so finding, the court 
sanctioned the welfare department's administrative practice of vary-
ing welfare grants according to nonindividualized criteria. 
Dullea is an illustration of one of the fundamental difficulties en-
countered by the designers and administrators of any welfare system-
the necessity for achieving a compromise between meeting individual 
needs and treating all recipients identically in accordance with stan-
dardized and generalized criteria. To the ext~nt that this compromise 
is reached by means of arbitrary categorizing on the basis of the num-
ber of children or the kind of living arrangements, the system will 
result in individual hardships not unlike those experienced by the 
rest of the population. But to the poor, an "individual hardship" 
means going without food or keeping a child home from school in 
cold weather because he or she has no. winter jacket. There is no lee-
way in the budget of a welfare recipient. · 
Before changes were effected in September 1970, Massachusetts had 
responded to hardship circumstances by recognizing "special needs"3 
and by permitting a substantial amount of discretion to be exercised 
by caseworkers in distributing supplementary welfare funds. The 
practice of giving special need grants had resulted in abuses and new 
inequities as welfare rights workers had encouraged recipients to make 
their needs known. Those recipients who were not articulate or who 
were assigned to unsympathetic social workers failed to benefit from 
the special needs arrangement and often suffered unnecessary hard-
' The variety of special needs was noted in State Letter 266, Aug. 28, 1970, which pro-
hibited the future recognition of special needs: "Effective September 16, 1970, the De-
partment will discontinue the practice of providing the following special needs: furni-
ture, household equipment and supplies, clothing, laundry expense, telephone, extra 
fuel payments, supplemental food orders or payments and back rent and utility payments." 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/5
§2.5 WELFARE LAW 23 
ships because they failed to receive the aid to which they were entitled. 
The individualized approach to welfare benefits embodied in special 
need grants broke down as soon as it was exposed to the full needs of 
welfare recipients. The special needs program was not able to deliver 
the kind of assistance that had been promised to recipients and at the 
same time preserve the safeguards against abuse demanded by the 
public. 
§2.5. Aid to Families with Dependent Children: 1 Flat grant sys-
tem. The flat grant system for recipients of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) was put into effect in the fall of 1970 as a 
solution to the problem of special needs.2 The flat grant was insti-
tuted by administrative action,3 with the impetus coming from the 
governor's office. Under the new arrangement, AFDC recipients are 
no longer entitled to receive additional money for special needs. In-
stead, all AFDC recipient families, regardless of actual need, receive 
every three months a check that is intended to cover unexpected ex-
penses, large outlays, and any other special needs that may arise. The 
ostensible rationale for the changeover was that a flat grant program 
would operate more equitably, dividing the available money among 
all recipients rather than allotting it only to those who were asking 
for it.4 One of the underlying purposes for the adoption of the flat 
grant system, admitted by everyone, was to eliminate one of the rally-
ing points for welfare rights demonstrations, which had proved rea-
sonably successful in obtaining special need grants for those who 
participated. While it is undoubtedly true that many nonparticipators 
also had special needs for which no welfare department money was 
forthcoming, it is equally true that the actual needs of recipient fami-
lies do vary because of individual circumstances. Varying circumstances 
continue to be recognized under the flat grant system by the allocation 
of "hardship funds," which provide some capacity to meet actual 
emergencies.5 Hardship funds to supplement the flat grant system 
are allocated by region in fixed sums, and are intended to be disbursed 
in last-resort situations. The power to determine the situations in 
which hardship funds will be used has been given to regional com-
mittees made up of welfare department personnel and recipients. Ac-
tual requests for hardship grants must be made by the recipient's 
social worker through departmental procedures. The requests are 
then filtered upward, sometimes coming before the regional committee 
itself, and sometimes being acted upon by an administrator who is 
purporting to follow committee guidelines. Whether or not a hard-
§2.5. IG.L.,c.ll8,§§1-ll. 
2 For a brief discussion of the special needs program, see §2.4 supra. 
'State Letters 266,267, and273 series, effective Sept. 15, 1970. 
4 Address by Governor Sargent, 66th Annual Massachusetts Conference on Social 
Welfare, Dec. 3, 1969: "No longer will those who clamor loudest receive most. Nor will 
those in genuine need be required to clamor for what they deserve. The flat grant will be 
standard for all families." 
s Mass. Public Assistance Policy Manual c. IV, at 4, as transmitted by State Letter 
273B, June 1, 1971. 
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ship request is granted depends upon such factors as who else is asking, 
how much money there is, the nature of the request, and who makes 
the determination. The diffused responsibility makes it virtually im-
possible for a recipient to identify the reason for, or the source of, the 
grant or denial of a request. Although the federal government ordinar-
ily requires a state to provide uniform benefits and uniform treatment 
to all recipients within the jurisdiction,6 waivers can be obtained for 
experimental programs.7 Such a waiver, effective for one year, was 
obtained for the hardship funds program in the early spring of 1971.8 
In practice, the flat grant system, with the supplementary hardship 
funds, seems to have resulted in a less visible, less assertive welfare 
population. It should not be assumed, however, that this means that 
recipients are more content or any better off. Evidence to the contrary 
has been given to the commissioner (}f public welfare by private chari-
ties, which have found that since the implementation of the flat grant 
system, welfare recipients have been turning increasingly to the chari-
ties for help with special needs.9 In fact, the flat grant system has 
largely resulted in depersonalizing the administration of welfare and 
shifting the attention of welfare administrators away from individual 
needs. It has protected the welfare department from having the smooth 
functioning of the system interfered with by individuals or by mem-
bers of welfare rights organizations; thus the flat grant has achieved 
in part what its proponents had intended. The decreased welfare rights 
activity is attributable to the fact that under the new system the possi-
bilities for direct, effective communication with the welfare depart-
ment about immediate needs have been virtually eliminated. 
Further evaluation of the flat grant system appears to be one of those 
tasks which has diminished in importance in many people's minds be-
cause of the expected federal take-over of welfare. The plan to extend 
the flat grant to other categories of relief has not been acted upon, and 
instead a different and much harsher solution to the problem of special 
needs has been put into effect for recipients of general relief. 10 The 
conflict between the design of the flat grant system, which attempts to 
make a welfare family's financial situation resemble that of the "nor-
mal" family, and the content of the system, a money grant which is 
insufficient to permit a "normal" existence, has not been resolved or 
even given a thorough examination. This may be understandable in 
light of the taxpaying public's current attitude toward welfare costs, 
but if the flat grant is going to live up to its advance notices as a wel-
fare reform measure, the issue must be dealt with. 
6 42 U .S.C. §602(a)( I). 
7 42 u.s.c. §1315. 
8 Letter from Regional Commissioner Neil P. Fallon, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education 
and Welfare, to Commissioner Steven A. Minter, Mass. Dept. of Public Welfare, Feb. 24, 
1971. 
9 Research Dept., United Community Services of Metropolitan Boston, Report on 
UCS Flat Grant Monitoring System (1971). 
10 The General Relief program is discussed in §2.6 infra. 
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§2.6. General Relief program: Administrative modifications. In 
comparison to AFDC recipients, those who receive General Relief 
have been subjected to much more drastic administrative action, 1 jus-
tified by the executive branch of the government as necessary in order 
to avert even more extreme steps which might be taken by the legisla-
ture.2 The validity of the governor's explanation for the new regula-
tions is difficult to evaluate. The legislation which was submitted 
to the General Court by the Special Legislative Committee to Inves-
tigate Welfare3 did contain some extraordinarily harsh measures, such 
as the imposition of a residency requirement4 and a 180-day limitation 
on the duration of benefit payments for which a General Relief recip-
ient was eligible.5 The'se portions of the bill and some similar propo-
sals, however, were eliminated before the final votes were taken by the 
legislature; the revision of the General Relief program which was 
signed into law6 is not much different from the administrative revision 
effected earlier by the executive branch. Whether the governor's feat 
in getting his cutbacks in first did contribute to the more rational 
provisions of the final bill is unclear; it is clear, however, that the 
welfare department's credibility among welfare recipients as an advo-
cate of the rights of the poor suffered as a result of its active role in 
developing the executive-sponsored legislation. 
It is noteworthy that the welfare department, prior to issuing its 
final regulation revising the General Relief program, held a public 
hearing on the contents of its proposed regulation and claimed to be 
using procedures which satisfied statutory requirements. 7 The final 
form of the regulation was in some respects a response to the criti-
cisms and comments submitted to the department at the time of the 
hearing.8 The department's use of statutory administrative proce-
dures is a promising development. 
The key changes accomplished by the new regulations in the Gen-
eral Relief program appear to be intended to reduce the number of 
persons eligible for General Relief. The personal property allowance 
has been revised downward: formerly an individual became eligible 
if the value of his personal property did not exceed $500; he will now 
§2.6. 1 State Letter279series, effective june 7, 1971. 
2 Press conference of Governor Sargent, Mar. 26, 1971, at which he stated that he 
"was concerned the legislators would begin 'making irresponsible cuts in the welfare 
program, and start eliminating persons who really do need assistance.' " Boston Globe, 
Mar. 27, 1971, at 6, col. 7. 
3 For a further discussion of the legislation, see §2.7 1njra. 
4 House Bill5850, Appendix B,§lA (1971). 
5 I d. §4. 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 908. 
7 G.L., c. 30A, §2, is cited in the notice of the hearing as controlling. 
8 E.g., witnesses at the May 21, 1971 hearing, including Sen. Jack Backman of the 
Norfolk and Suffolk Senatorial District, strongly criticized the new eligibility limits 
proposed by the department. Under the proposal the amount of personal property that 
would disqualify an applicant for relief was to be reduced from $500 to $50. As is noted 
in the text, the final regulations, which were issued after the hearing, set the amount at 
$250. 
9
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become eligible only when that value does not exceed $250.9 No student 
(someone "regularly attending a college or university for the purpose 
of securing advanced education") is eligible for General Relief. No 
person under 21 is entitled to receive regular, continuing assistance 
until the inability of that person's parents to provide support has been 
ascertained and documented. Both men and women are to register with 
the Division of Employment Security unless, in the case of a female, she 
has a child under high school age. The special needs program for Gen-
eral Relief recipients, covering such things as clothing, household 
equipment and supplies, telephone expenses, special fuel costs, and 
household repairs, has been altogether discontinued. Eligibility for 
General Relief is to be redetermined frequently at specified intervals. 
Changes such as those above can easily be made in General Relief 
because there is no federal participation in the program and, there-
fore, no requirements which must be met in order to receive a federal 
contribution. The statistics issued by the welfare department for the 
months following the effective date of the General Relief regulations 
show a significant decrease in the cost of the program.10 Although the 
decrease may be attributed to the more stringent eligibility require-
ments, it is equally possible that it is due to any one of a number of 
other reasons such as an improvement in the job market or a shift of 
General Relief recipients to other programs. Whatever the cause, the 
immediate downturn is likely to reinforce the beliefs that much of the 
taxpayers' money spent on assistance for the poor isn't really needed 
and is wasted or received by "cheaters," and that a "get tough" policy 
is really all that is needed to get the situation back under control. The 
proponents of this line of thought often resist any attempt to cure 
root causes of poverty. They insist instead that there is not in fact 
much "real" poverty and that there is, therefore, no need for a mas-
sive plan of action. The governor and the welfare department, by 
assuming a "get tough" posture with respect to General Relief, re-
grettably furnished some support to those who would legislate away 
the symptoms of the welfare crisis by unreasonably restricting eligi-
bility for assistance. 
§2.7. Legislation. In June of 1971, the Special Legislative Com-
mittee to Investigate Welfare issued an interim report1 which served 
to focus public and legislative attention on welfare. The three appen-
dices to the report contained specific proposals for legislation. The 
report itself makes a number of sensible points about: the need to im-
prove welfare administration and appears to give sympathetic recog-
9 This change and those subsequently mentioned are all prescribed in the State Letter 
279 series. 
10 In May, 1971, the General Relief caseload was 32,900 cases. June showed a slight 
decrease to 32,488 cases, a 1.3 percent change. In comparison, however, total General 
Relief payments in May amounted to $6,455,606, while in June the total was $4,408,042, 
a reduction of 31.7 percent. The average monthly payment decreased by $60.54. 
§2.7. 1 HouseBill5850(1971). 
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nition to the needs and problems of the poor in Massachusetts. 2 The 
effect of his humane approach, however, is diluted by the documenta-
tion offered by the committee to support its findings of abuses, since 
many of the examples offered to prove its allegations of fraud are in 
fact examples of the cruel dilemmas encountered by those who must 
subsist on welfare. 3 The committee appears to be more concerned in 
its legislative proposals with the correction of abuses in the existing 
program than with the need to design an adequate and fair welfare 
system. Its proposals, for the most part, embody the nonsolutions to 
the welfare crisis which have been current throughout the country in 
1971: reducing benefits and narrowing eligibi1ity.4 The committee 
seems to be concerned primarily with reducing the cost of welfare 
and little with aiding the poor. The committee also proposed some 
administrative changes designed to build "business principles" into 
welfare and to improve the state's fraud-detecting capability. 5 
One of the committee's major proposals, subsequently enacted by 
the legislature,6 was a revision of Chapter 117 of the General Laws, 
which furnishes the statutory basis for the General Relief program. 
Financed solely by the state, General Relief provides assistance to needy 
persons who are ineligible for the categorical aid which the state and 
federal governments cooperatively provide to the blind, the elderly, 
the disabled, and families with dependent children. 7 Recipients of 
2 E.g., the report states in part: "As a direct result of the failure by the Department of 
Public Welfare since July I, 1968, to responsibly administer the financial affairs of the 
agency, the entire public assistance system in the Commonwealth has become widely 
criticized and has brought widespread condemnation of welfare recipients." Id. at 21. 
The report further states: "This committee has not heard one single voice raised by any 
legislator in opposition to the granting of assistance to any eligible recipient. On the 
contrary, their actions and energy have been directed toward providing greater and more 
meaningful assistance by demanding a more effective implementation of the welfare 
programs to meet the needs of all eligible welfare recipients. Their tone has been one of 
compassion for the indigent and less fortunate individuals. This is as it should be." Id. 
at 274. 
3 One example noted in the report is Case No. F 923: "Recipient and two children have 
been on AFDC continuously since 1962. In September 1970 she began work in a hospital 
but concealed this fact from her social worker. She admitted that she did this as she knew 
that otherwise the AFDC payments would be reduced and that she wanted to move out 
of her housing project into a better living situation. She received a total of $2,529.11 in 
fraudulent payments and signed a statement in which she agreed to reimburse the de-
partment with payments of $5.00 per month. Simple arithmetic indicates that this will 
take 42 years." Id. at 212. 
4 See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1971, at I, col. 5, reporting U.S. Dept. of Health, Education 
and Welfare, Trends in AFDC Benefit Levels-Summer Memorandum (July 1971). The 
committee's proposals to achieve these ends were contained in House Bill 5850, Appendix 
A (1971) (a residency requirement) and in certain sections of Appendices Band C. 
5 House Bill5850, Appendix C ( 1971 ). 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 908, §§ 1-25. 
7 The present framework for federal partiCipation in public assistance is through 
identifying kinds or "categories" of people to be helped by joint federal-state programs. 
The state operates the program in accordance with federal standards that determine 
eligibility, services to be provided, and procedures that must be followed. The state is 
reimbursed by the federal government for a percentage of the assistance payments and for 
75 percent of the cost of social services provided to recipients. Poor people who fit into 
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General Relief are a relatively small group, are generally unorganized 
because many of them are only temporarily eligible for welfare (those 
who receive aid for longer periods are likely to have physical or men-
tal handicaps which make them unemployable for practical purposes 
and thus entitled to categorical assistance), and are in fact totally de-
pendent upon the General Relief program for survival.8 The revi-
sion of Chapter ll7 forbids giving assistance to purchase fumiture. 9 
It also requires a verification of the facts establishing eligibility be-
fore any assistance other than two weeks' worth of shelter costs and 
food orders can be given; the severity of this provision is mitigated, 
however, by a requirement that the eligibility determination be made 
within the two-week period. 10 A similar requirement of full verfica-
tion prior to assistance, with the exception of two weeks' worth of 
shelter costs and food orders, was proposed for AFDC applicants by the 
committee, and an attempt was made to narrow AFDC benefits as 
well.ll There are federal provisions, however, which have been inter-
preted to offer some protection against benefit reductions to AFDC re-
cipients, 12 and the AFDC flat grant system made the committee's pro-
posed prohibition on grants for special needs less significant than it 
might otherwise have been. Since General Relief recipients are not 
now protected by federal regulations or subject to a flat grant system, 
they would have been severely affected by the passage of the commit-
tee's legislation were it not for the fact that the state's new welfare reg-
ulations13 cover much the same ground. It was a popular year in 
which to make political hay at the expense of the helpless and vulner-
able General Relief recipients. 
The administrative change which attracted the most attention was 
the committee's proposal to create a "fraud squad" to track down and 
collect evidence against the persons responsible for welfare abuses. 14 
The committee proposed placing the fraudulent claims bureau with 
none of the categories are dependent upon state aid, which in Massachusetts is dispensed 
through the General Relief program. 
8 This is evident from the eligibility requirements for General Relief. In order to re-
ceive assistance an individual must own no more than $250 worth of personal property 
and a family must own no more than $500. State Letter 279B, June I, 1971. 
9 G.L., c.ll7, §I, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 908. 
10 G.L., c. 117, §5, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 908. 
11 The~e proposals were part of Senate Bill 1569, which was enacted by the legisla-
ture during the 1971 session, returned by the governor with proposed amendments, re-
enacted by the legislature during the closing days of the session, and then pocket-vetoed 
by the governor on November 17, 1971. In vetoing the bill, however, the governor stated 
that the commissioner of public welfare was being ordered to put into effect these eligi-
bility verification requirements and a ban on all special grants for AFDC recipients ex-
cept grants for special diets, rental exceptions, and hardship situations. Boston Globe, 
Nov. 18, 1971, at 31, col. I. 
12 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(23), as construed in Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1356 
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded, 397 
u.s. 397 (1970). 
u The new regulations are discussed in §2.6 supra. 
14 House Bill5850, Appendix C, §§ 1-4 ( 1971 ). 
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the state auditor's department. It appeared that as many as fifty new 
jobs would be created. After some political maneuvering, the plan 
was revised; as enacted it calls for a bureau of welfare auditing to be 
within the executive department and under the governor's control. 15 
A second proposed change, which would seem to be of equal signifi-
cance, was a requirement that welfare office directors and regional ad-
ministrators have a business background. 16 Under the present laws, 
where qualifications for welfare department personnel are specified, 
social service experience or the equivalent is requiredY The bill 
incorporating the business background proposal was vetoed by the 
governor. 18 
One of the committee's key proposals was a one-year residency re-
quirement for all recipients of aid. 19 Similar legislation was passed 
in several states during the year,20 in each case with implementation 
being enjoined pending a judicial determination of constitutionality.21 
The bill imposing a residency requirement in Massachusetts was 
passed by the House of Representatives, but the Senate Ways and 
Means Committee deferred acting upon it until an opinion as to its 
constitutionality could be obtained from the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Court's opinion stated that the proposed act would be unconsti-
tutionaJ22 and the bill died in committee. The Senate's reasoned ap-
proach to the residency issue was very encouraging to persons con-
cerned about the Commonwealth's tendency to emulate legislation, 
passed by other states, that reflects an unreasoning welfare backlash. 
To date, reform legislation has not been as vindictive as it might have 
been, and credit is due to both the executive and the legislative branches 
of government. 
During the 1971 session, the legislature also dealt with the problems 
created by the federal government's action in increasing social security 
15 Acts of 1971, c. 943, §§1-5, adding G.L., c. 7, §§30Q-30T. 
16 House Bill5850, Appendix C, §§2, 12, and 23 ( 1971 ). 
17 E.g., G.L., c. 18, §5, which provides: "Each community service center shall be 
under the administration, supervision and control of a center director who ... shall be 
qualified by having received a master's degree from an accredited graduate school of 
social work, and by having professional experience of not less than five years as an ad-
ministrator or supervisor of social welfare programs." The impact of requirements such 
as the above is beginning to be felt as older employees of the department retire. Many of 
those now reaching retirement age were transferred to the department when the Com-
monwealth relieved the cities and towns of responsibility for welfare programs (Acts of 
1967, c. 658); often these local administrators were not required to have, and in fact did 
not have, any social service training or background. 
18 Boston Globe, Nov. 18, 1971, at31, col. I. 
19 House Bill5850, Appendix A ( 1971 ). 
2o Conn. Laws 1971, Special Act No. I, §15; N.Y. Laws 1971, c. 606; R.I. Pub. Laws 
1971, c. 290. 
21 Besaw v. Affleck, Civil No. 4684 (D.R.I. Aug. 2, 1971) (enjoining the Rhode Island 
residency statute); Rivera v. Dunn, Civil No. 14,517 (D. Conn. July 29, 1971) (enjoining 
the Connecticut residency statute); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(enjoining the New York residency statute). 
22 Opinion ofthe Justices, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1281,273 N.E.2d 879. 
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benefits and in making the increase retroactive.23 Chapter 248 of the 
Acts of 1971 provides that the lump sum payment of the retroactive 
benefits is to be disregarded by the welfare department in determining 
a person's eligibility for Old Age Assistance (OAA) or Disability As-
sistance (DA). Without this law the receipt of the lump sum payment 
might have made some welfare recipients ineligible to receive their 
regular monthly assistance payments because they would be in pos-
session of cash assets in an amount in excess of departmental limits. 
A more complex dilemma presented by the social security increase 
was resolved by the passage of Chapter 698 of the Acts of 1971,24 which 
provides for an increase in the leisure time allowance of all OAA and 
DA recipients, an increase in the transportation allowance for all OAA 
and DA recipients who are not inmates of nursing homes or institu-
tions, and an increase in the incidental expenses allowance given to 
recipients of Aid to the Blind (ATB). The effect of the law is to increase 
OAA and DA basic budgets for noninstitutionalized recipients and 
A TB basic budgets for all recipients by the amount of the social se-
curity increase. When an individual's social security payment is 
deducted from the recipient's budgeted figure in order to ascertain 
what the state's payment will be, the resulting amount will be as much 
as it was prior to the social security increase. The benefits of the fed-
eral action will thus accrue to the recipient who receives social security 
benefits, since the combined total of a recipient's monthly federal and 
state checks will in fact be greater. The benefits will also accrue to the 
recipient who is totally dependent upon public assistance, since the 
pass-through of federal payrp.ents without a corresponding reduction 
of state payments, as provided by Chapters 248 and 698, increases the 
total payments to all OAA and DA recipients. Spurred by the federal 
action, the Commonwealth recognized the impact of an inflationary 
economy upon social security recipients. At the same time, however, 
the legislature rejected the governor's effort to provide a cost-of-living 
increase for AFDC recipients. By its inconsistent actions, the legisla-
ture reflected the distinction made in the public mind between AFDC 
recipients, who are thought somehow to be responsible for their 
plight and undeserving of assistance, and the elderly, blind, and dis-
abled, whose victimization by circumstances is accepted and sym-
pathetically responded to by the public. 
The tendency toward liberal lawmaking as long as it doesn't cost 
anything, often displayed by the Massachusetts legislature, surfaced 
to benefit the poor in at least two laws enacted in the 1971 session. 
Chapter 373 of the Acts of 1971 revises G.L., c. lll, §128H, which 
deals with the rights of migrant workers. Section 128H had formerly 
provided that a migrant worker not living in the quarters of his em-
ployer had the right to have visitors outside of regular working hours, 
but no notice to that effect was required. The amendment provides 
23 Act of Mar. 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-5, §202, 85 Stat. 10, amending 42 U.S.C. §§427-
428. 
24 Acts of 1971, c. 698, §§1-4, amending G.L., c. liSA, §1, c. ll8D, §4, and c. 6, §130. 
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that a notice of visitation rights, printed in both English and Spanish, 
be posted for the workers' benefit, requires the Department of Public 
Health to establish minimum standards for visitation rights by issuing 
pertinent regulations, and provides a mechanism for enforcement of 
visitation rights. The legislative intent discernible in the visitation 
statute indicates that the earlier law was not providing the degree of 
protection that was expected. The fault can be attributed primarily 
to the employers of migrant labor, who have frequently impeded ef-
forts of social workers and organizers to make contact with the workers, 
but it would appear possible as well that the Department of Public 
Health had failed to exercise its powers vigorously. The problem of 
legislation falling into a vacuum at the administrative level, as may 
have occurred with respect to the former visitation statute, is partic-
ularly acute when the lawmakers attempt to create rights for, or pro-
tect rights of, minority groups. To date there has been found no work-
able solution which can be enforced from the upper administrative 
levels downward-if the beneficiaries of the legislation fail to learn 
about and effectively assert their new rights for themselves, the legis-
lation has no practical effect. The revision of the migrant worker 
law appears to be an attempt to ensure that the workers can find out 
about their rights and that there is an avenue open for the assertion 
of their rights. With concerned citizens' groups attempting to contact 
and encourage migrant workers, the workers should be able to force-
fully assert their rights. 
The other new piece of progressive legislation is Chapter 726 of the 
Acts of 1971,25 which attempts to eliminate discrimination against 
persons who receive public assistance simply because of their status 
as welfare recipients. The statute provides that it shall be unlawful 
... [f]or any person furnishing credit, services or renting ac-
commodations to discriminate against any individual who is a 
recipient of federal, state or local public assistance, including 
medical assistance, or who is a tenant receiving federal, state or 
local housing subsidies, including rental assistance or rent supple-
ments, solely because the individual is such a recipient. 26 
Chapter 726 is designed to eliminate flat refusals to grant charge ac-
counts, loans, or mortgages to recipients of public assistance and to 
eliminate the granting of such credit to public assistance recipients on 
terms which are harsher than those accorded similarly situated persons 
who do not receive public assistance. The act is also meant to ensure 
that the services furnished by doctors, druggists, and others to public 
assistance recipients are equal in all respects to the services provided 
to those who do not receive such assistance, and that rental housing 
is provided to public assistance recipients on the same basis that it is 
provided to nonrecipients. Chapter 726 does not require that all in-
dividuals or corporations supplying credit, services, or rental housing 
23 Actsofl97l,c. 726,amendingG.L.,c.l51B,§4. 
26 1bid. 
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deal with all public assistance recipients on terms identical to those 
accorded all nonrecipients. What it does require is that individual 
recipients be treated as individuals. If a recipient has failed in the past 
to pay his bills promptly, one subject to the act would have a valid 
reason for denying him credit in the future. However, the mere fact 
that an individual is a public assistance recipient is not in itself an 
adequate reason for discriminating against him in any way. 
Chapter 726 will be enforced by the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination. When a complaint is filed with the commis-
sion, an investigation and hearing are to be held, and an order issued 
either dismissing the complaint or requiring remedial action. Any per-
son aggrieved by an order of the commission may seek judicial review. 
A corollary to the need for physicians and hospitals to obtain in-
formation as to the eligibility of prospective patients for medical assis-
tance is the need to protect the physician or the hospital from any 
liability arising from such disclosure. Chapter 335 of the Acts of 1971 
adds Section 12G to Chapter 112 of the General Laws; the new section 
provides that a disclosure of information to specified agencies concern-
ing "the diagnosis, treatment or condition of a patient in connection 
with the establishment of eligibility for, or entitlement to" any public 
assistance benefits shall not be grounds for any civil or criminal liabil-
ity. In another development related to medical services, the legislature 
postponed for another year the effective date of the law prohibiting 
the comptroller from advancing funds to the welfare department to pay 
providers of medicaid services.27 
§2.8. Budget considerations. A key factor in the current welfare 
picture is the legislature's determination of the welfare department 
budget, including the supplementary budget and the deficiency bud-
get.1 The department's requests for funds for the fiscal year 1972 were 
cut significantly before they reached the legislature, and further cuts 
were made at that stage.2 Efforts to put a ceiling on the total welfare 
budget for the year were barely headed off, as was an attempt to control 
expenditures by appropriating funds on a monthly basis. One of the 
consequences of the legislature's intense reaction to the ever-increasing 
cost of welfare and the deficiencies in its administration was the im-
mense difficulty in convincing the lawmakers of the value of an effort 
27 Acts ofl97l, c. 471. 
§2.8 1 The Department of Public Welfare seeks funds from the legislature at three 
different times during a calendar year. The first of these requests is included in the de-
ficiency budget, which contains all the requests for operating funds needed by various 
departments because the original appropriations for the current fiscal year were inade-
quate. The deficiency budget is usually considered by the legislature early in the session. 
Then the budget for the next fiscal year is taken up, in which appears the welfare depart-
ment's request for funds for the coming year. Finally, a supplementary budget is presented 
to the legislature late in the session requesting amounts needed for new programs to 
meet changed circumstances, or to replace funds cut from the current budget. 
2 According to figures released by Commissioner Minter, the department requested 
$929 million for the 1972 fiscal year, and Governor Sargent reduced this to $816 million. 
The legislature appropriated $8ll million. Acts of 1971, c. 719. 
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to expand human services in Massachusetts by matching up private 
funds and federal funds under state auspices, without any expendi-
ture of state tax money. Similar "donated funds" programs are used 
extensively in other states to increase the flow of federal money into 
such states for child welfare and supporting services, including day 
care. Massachusetts had been making modest progress in utilizing 
this program until the executive branch determined that legislative 
action was needed before these nonstate funds could be expended by 
the welfare department.3 The necessary legislative authorization has 
not been easy to obtain, and attempts to secure assent to a donated 
funds program, either by authorization in a separate statute or through 
a line item of the budget, have met with substantial opposition. An 
appropriation for the program was made, however, in the 1972 supple-
mentary budget.4 To a limited extent, therefore, Massachusetts will 
be able to avail itself of donated funds arid put them to use in provid-
ing needed services for residents of the Commonwealth. 
A final welfare note for the year is furnished by a provision passed 
as part of the budget for the 1972 fiscal year. The provision conditions 
the appropriation of General Relief funds upon the institution of a 
requirement that all General Relief recipients determined by the wel-
fare department to be employable persons receive their assistance 
checks from the nearest office of the Division of Employment Security.5 
The provision's proponents expect that this will result in more job 
referrals and consequently fewer persons receiving aid under the Gen-
eral Relief program. The welfare department conducted a review of 
its General Relief caseload following the passage of this law and iden-
tified approximately one-fifth of the recipients as "employable." These 
persons are now regularly reporting to the Division of Employment 
Security for job counseling prior to receiving their checks, but the 
preliminary reports indicate that there are very few job openings. Un-
less the state creates some new employment opportunities, the new 
scheme is likely to have very little impact. 
§2.9. Conclusion. Many different groups in Massachusetts are 
concerned about the structure and operation of our welfare system, 
including local welfare rights organizations, community groups, so-
cial workers, legal services lawyers, civic organizations, and the legis-
lature. They do not all agree on the changes which should be made, 
but they all speak of the need for change and apparently view change 
as desirable. However, despite a hospitable attitude and a considerable 
amount of generalized discussion of the issues, almost no one worked 
'The problem appears attributable to a revised interpretation of Acts of 1969, c. 569, 
which added § 17B to Chapter I 0 of the General Laws. Section 17B provides in part: 
"The state treasurer may receive the principal of any funds given or bequeathed to the 
commonwealth .... Upon request of the agency the state treasurer shall, subject to 
appropriation, expend the income of the fund, and such parts of the principal as may be 
subject to the control of the agency, in such manner as the agency may direct, subject to 
any condition affecting the administration thereof." 
4 Acts of 1971, c. 1003, Item 1900· 1020 (in the amount of$145,000). 
5 Acts of 1971, c. 719, Item 1906-2000. 
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for or recommended any significant change at the state level in our 
welfare programs during the 1971 SuRVEY year. The activity in the field 
of welfare law reflected, for the most part, the usual tug-of-war over 
the amount of money available and the ways in which it was being 
administered by the Department of Public Welfare. The silent passivity 
on the part of so many of those previously most concerned with the 
operation of the welfare system, which appears to be a reaction to the 
proposal to federalize welfare, may be the most far-reaching conse-
quence of the federal initiative. The reaction of concerned groups to 
the federal proposal suggests that if federalization does occur and the 
new system functions efficiently and impersonally from its remote 
center of operations, the level of concern over and interest in welfare 
activity on the local level may well diminish. If the result of the federal-
ization of welfare is that recipients will lose the visibility and the sym-
pathy which they now have, it will happen at a time when the task of 
welfare reform is only half done. While many systemic reforms have 
taken place, the system itself has not yet been radically altered, and no 
new concept has supplanted the idea that welfare is simply a govern-
ment-operated charity. There is much work yet to be done, both in 
developing new concepts and in creating the public interest in them 
which is necessary to the embodiment of any new legislation. 
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